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\

CBC:

This tape, which will be recorded on 24 June 1984 (1985) at 11:00 a.m.,

consists of an interview of Cecil Currey with former CIA Director, William E.
Colby.
I appreciate very much vour takinq time out of your schedule to meet
with. me today.
When they talk

First there is a real simple question, Mr. Colby.
about an agent under deep cover.

What does deep cover mean?

Essentially, it means under private cover,

WEC:

Means non-official.

CBC:

Could you give me an example?

WEC:

Work for the XYZ Export Corporation.

CBC:

And that would be opposed to just plain cover?

WEC:

Cover is any kind of thing, whether it's really serious- or not.

Manv-

people in embassies are known to certain people and even tot-he local i_ntelliqence
authorities •.•
CBC:

Well, what kind of cover would this be?

General Lansdale told me tha,t

when he went out to the Philippines as an intelligence officer, he went to
the Philippines with the cover of an intelligence officer.
WEC:

Well, as an official of the U.S. qovernment.

CBC;

Uhn, hunh.

WEC:

Yeah.

CBC:

Uhn, hunh.

WEC:

That would not be.

CBC:

Uhn, hunh.

That would not be deep.

OK.

Can you tell me when you were oosted to the CIA Saigon des:k?
WEC:

'58.

I left Italy after five years a,nd went to the desk for a, couple

of months, to Vietnam.
it was.

I arrived in Vietnam on TET

1

59.

February, April, wna,tever

I
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enc:

It was a little quiet er than later , a more famou s TET?

WEC:

Yeah-.

CBC:

How did you meet Ed Lansd ale?

WEC:

vis:tt ed 'Vietni"l,1'{}
Well, I think the Urst time I met him was when he-

tfie new; Kenne dy a,dn,li_n ist'l'.:at;tcm ,
a.t the end of the Eisen hower regim e and on behal f of
in the Philip pines- oefor e-,
and he arrive d ••. I heard of him and his activ ities
Agenc y at the time. He had
but I also knew that he was not assoc iated with the
the Agenc y; but as I recal l,
some job ove:r- in Defen se, which had him dealin g with

I ha,dn 't dealt with him parti cular ly at that stage .
CBC;

about him befor ewould you tell me what kinds of thing s you had hea.rd

you met him?
s-. His rela.ti :cmWell, J heard tha,t he ha,d a great empat hy for the Asia.n
one ,
been
close , - suppo rtive i2 >Ne haet:b een
ship with Magsa ysay had / a very succe ssful one, very

WEC;

ities.
an idea man, man for brigh t ideas for polit ical activ
he was in Vietna m in the '54 ...'. 55 perio d.

I also knew that

I didn 't know too much_ about hi_m,

ps with- Diem and had been
althou gh I knew that he had some very good relati onshi
suppo rtive of Diem a t

a perio d when the Unite d State s gover nment had its

with the Natio nalis: ts·.
doubt s wheth er it shoul d stay with the Frenc h or go
the Natio nalis ts.
And Lansd ale had been assign ed the job of liais on with

Of;

broth er, was my main conta ct.
cours e the Vietn amese , Diem ... Nhu, the presi dent' s
contr ibutio ns and the speci fic
He was a little dubio us of the value of Lansd ale '·s
ideas that he came up with.
CBC:

ring to Rober t
When you say the presi dent' s broth er, you are refer

Kenne dy ?
WEC:

No, Nqo Dinh Nhu.

CBC:

Oh, ok, ok.
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WEC:

President ...

CBC:

President Diem '·s brother, ok, ok.

WEC:

Was· a little dubious of it, but I had the feeling that he. was also

protecting his own position as the Counselor to President Diem, and so consequently it was never indicated while he was around, t ha,'1: it was marginal
contribution.

I don't think his contribution was marginal at all.

He was

very significant in bringing American support to Diem and keepi,n g Arneri:ca,n
support behind Diem at a time when he was going out, smashing the sect armies
and things like that.
But when I met him on his trip in '60, ' 61, Januar y '61 it was, he..
had been sent by the new administration •. ,

Sorry.
CBC:

You said that when you met him in Januar y of

WEC;

'61.

1

61 • •

He was over to look at the situation fo;i:i the new: a,dlgi,ni:stra,ti:on

because the. new· administration had expressed an interest in counter insurgency ,
was concerned a,bout the direction of events in Vietna;m, which. by then i,t was
obvious that the Communists were building up their forces: and building up tliei';i,attack on the government of South_Vietnam ,
it.

And he came ove:I'.' to get a looka.t

He was particularly, I think, a little dubious about the CIA, role, becaa,se

he was- a li.ttle questioning how· we were going into these. various· rural experimentsthat we were going into, of organizing local defense and local activities.
CBC:

CIDG was· a CIA operation?

WEC ;

That was· still a CIA operation at that time, and , you know, some. othex;,

comparable expe.r iments· we were running.

A,nd I think he was· curious • • , he was: a

little curious as to whethe:I'.' they were real.

But he. had some- good contacts
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saw Nhu;
on the Vietna mese side; the Presid ent obviou sly; I think he
TA(.(.o..n
(013? ➔ -Defen se
'l'fie,fia.
with
Delta
the
down
trip
and he partic ularly took a

WEC:

-r A t,c.. o.. ..-i

Minist e.r at the time, was Secret arv of State, '±'h:emh
what he was.

I'll think of it.

(n.

I can't remem ber

And I think he was convin ced by what the

to be very supoo rtive
Vietna mese told hi.m that we were doing, and that we seemed
tial.
a.nd that our experi ments offere d some verv intere sting poten
CBC:

Uhn, hunh.

WEC;

than Wflen he.
So I think he went home with a much more positi ve attitu de

had arrive d,

Of course , we were treati ng him a little bit with kid gloves

Ambas sador.
becaus e the rumor circu it ha.d that he might become the new

So we

trying to convin ce
were obviou sly presen ting oursel ves as well a.s we could, and
him that some of. our exoeri ments were in the right direct ion.

Thev were t:r:ying

ch to the · wa.x: .
ta build rural secur.; itv rather tha.n taking the milita rv approa
CBC:

during
How well do you think vou actua lly were able to achiev e that

those yea.rs?
WEC;

Which ••.

CBC;

Civili a.nize d a,Pp;t:oa.ch rather than a milita ry one .

WEC:

our exoe.ri Well, I think the major contri bution that we made wa,& tha,t

ation of some of the.
ments beqan to intere st Ngo Dinh Nhu, that with some alte:t;
gic hamle ts.
de.tai ls, he essen tially took it as the strate gy for the strate
quite well durlng
And tu:('ned it into a nation wise progra m wlaich, I think, worked
1

62 until the Buddh ists troubl e arose in '63.

fell apart.

At that time , the whole thino

had
But they were on the oroper strate oy and both Diem and Nhu

.s war; to build
select ed strate oic hamle ts as the right way to fioht the oeoole
ficati on a.nd partic ipaup the local level, to build securi tv and communi.tv identi
tion .

/
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' CBC:

Well, it sounds like the sort of thing that Lansda le had not only

on in
urged earlie r on when he was there full time, but that he had worked
the Philipp ines also.
WEC:

Yeah., well in the Philipp ines he was more ... he was dealinq with_

get Pres;td ent
an establi shed electo ral system , and the questio n there was how to
d proMaqsav sav elected and then how to get some of these politic ally oriente
qrams goinq in the countrv side . to face up to the Huks.

In Vietnam you did not

tatj:on
have much. of a politic al structu re: you had a much. more. direct confron
up, rather
in the village s, and it needed rural orqani zation from the bottom
than proqra,m s from the top down.

And that's what we were trying to develop

out of these strate.g ic hamlet program s.

Ngo Dinh- Nhu got a little over-

and that
pre.ssu rized on itwant ing to achieve very rapid results verv quickly
time., tii/.;\.t
created a little ... he used to rail aqains t the bureau crats all the.
theiy would ·· 1ie to him about the progre ss and so forth.

He knew tiiey were

the riqh:t
lvinq to him, that, you know, like a good strateg y, once vou ha,ve
to be
idea, then pus.h it hard, and accept the fact that there are qoing
failinq s in it.

You correc t those, but you don't abandon the- strateg y.

You

don't PUS.Sy foot the strateq y just because you have failing s i_n it, but you
push it harder .
CBC:

And that was his concep t, and I think he was· right ,

You spoke about Nhu heinq concern ed about the bureau cracy tha,t wasn't

he. feels
pushinq hi.s prog;r;-am well enough_ Well, Lansda le told me once that
perhap s
wa,s actual ly
that/on e of the most essent i.al thinqs to have been done. in Vietnam
to create a bureau cracy,
WEC:

Uhn hunh.

CBC:

That undei;- the French ., ..

WEC:

Yea,h.

CBC:

•.• they had such low level positio ns ...

J
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WEC:

Yeah.

Well, you see, the Problem was when the Communists took over

;tn North Vietnam, they drove into exile or murdered most of the previous
bureaucracy,

They had a very bad time for three or four years.

created their own bureaucracy,

their own manaqement structure ,

They, finally
When Diem

took over, he was so weak, literally; he only controlled the space of: hi~:t
palace. grounds, that he wasn't about to he able to eliminate bureaucracy.
and what he did was absorb it with all its French- failings.

And then in a

gradual process, set UP a national administration on the. model of the one,
that was set up in France, immediate post-war era from which people like
Giscard D'Es:taing came, and his thouqht then was to use the American educational
system, put there in the American Civil Service concept, to develop a new·
bureaucracy and gradually replace the old one and not destabilize the. situati.on
totally while he was trying to put a new one in.

Nhu's concevt in the strategic

hamlet was quite different, and I think, very interesting in that he was· complaini.n g _,- about the class structure in the bureaucrats, and the establishment,
the colonial establishment, that ran the country.
it, hut he was still complaininq, you see.

Of course, he was a part of

And I thought, verv well .

His

concept of strateqic hamlet was less a securitv matter than a qeneratinq
factor for a new base for a new Vietnam,

He felt that the new leade:t;"ship of

Vietnam would come out of these role communities if you could just get them
f unctioning and organized, then the new leaders would come up with. real
Vietnamese ideas· rather than French colonial ideas on how the country should
be run.

And it 1 s a very intere.stinq social expe:t;"iment.

It was conducted

during a war and obviously had obstacles to it greater than we could handle.
But this is not an abnormal thing.

Of course, other countries.· have tried

thi.s same kind of reqeneration • • • to try t o generate a new fundamental national
base for their country.
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CBC:

Well, when Lansdale came over on this mission, how long di:d he vis:-:t.t

the country at that point?
Something like that.

WEC:

About two weeks.

CBC:

And did you have pretty much d a y-by-day contact with- him?

WEC:

No, we had one session and then a couple more, maybe,

more.
thinq.

One or two

And he would see some of our office rs out in the field; that sort' of ·
I deliberately didn't try to take hold of him, because. I wanted to

just present our case and t hen let him make up his own mind.

Actuallv the

thing that supported our case more than anvthing were the Vietnamese ,

They

felt that it wa s working.
CBC:

Would you sav that as a result of your work and his, tha t you are

friends or speakinq acquaintances or •••
WEC:

We ' r e • . . we 1 re colleagues who agree on a great number of thin.gs about

how t he nature. of the war out t here was more a politi cal war than a soldi er's
wa r.

we don 't see each othe r t hat often, but we a re quite fr;~endly when we

see each o the:c.

I hav-e great r e spect fc,:r him and

r think he thinks my programs

ma.de a certain amount of sense.
CBC;

~-

lie l:,kes you.

WE ,...

Well •••

CBC:

I was with him yesterd~y and •••

WEC;

we.1 1, I think we both like each other, but we don I t ever see. ea,dL

other that much.

:I;

fec.l very ·.-,a~ anr1 fr~_endly -=tnd ver:; su:;;:po~tive of him.

J''m snre t-hat he has things tha,-t I did that he kind of questi:pns:, and I a,m
R-Url? thc,t there a.re thtng~ th;;t he dicl, that I kind of quest:ion ,
know·, that ts incidenta.l, f rom a f r iendship,
CRC:

But, you

The main linP--, tota, l a,g,,.ee.rnent- .

He said tha;t. you had written a oiece cr1lled "The Ten Great Spies" ""or
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·CBC:

something like t hat .

WEC:

nh, ::,eah, yeah..

CBC:

YP,ah, tlv>t 1 s what he was saying.

that around?

I p11t htm in it .

Do you happen to ha,ve a copy o f

I wou ldn't want you to jump u~ at this instant, but if you have

a cop y I wouJd very much enjoy borrowing it long enough to qet a Xer ox .
(pause as looks f o r paper )
WEC:

mentioned before
The name of this Vietnamese r/wa.s Nguyen (.sp?) Thua,n • . T K u A N.

He was Secretary of State at that t i me ; he later became Minis ter of Defense.
CBC:

Ok, shif ting subjects .

service record .

I managea to qet from the Air For ce Lansdal e's

The thing , as you can imagine, is about th;,t t hick .

And having

gone through it, I am puzzled, because •. .
WEC :

How did he become a Mrl.jor General?

CBC:

Well, that's part of i t.

T-!e doesn't pilot a n a.i!'.'pl 1me; he is not a

maintenance offi<::er; he's gone to only one Air Force Stats School, although
he was asked to teach at the National War College and places like that; he's
never commanded a Wing or any of the ot he:r. Ai r Force no:i::mal things; yet, he is
the ve ...y model of a monern Major General.
(Laughter)
WEC:

He • .. now the military do throw up people like this.

They are a little

off the bea t, the normal l ine, but I can think o f a number of them.

Geor ge

Benson .- . actually Vern Wal ters, our new A.mbrissa_dor to the Unit ed Nati ons, is· a.
specific example.

He never commanded a squad , and ye t he, ended as a. Lt. Gen'l'.'a,l.

He wa,s one of two graduates of the Office rs Candidate Sch0ol who got to be
sta rs .
CBC:

W~ll.

WEC:

And he did it by his ma.gni f;i. cant comma,nd of

langua ges

, h.ts

abili ty to be in exactly the right pla ce c1t the right time, t o be a. very

,--'
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' WEC :

loyal a nd effective o ff j cer, dealing with fore igners, Brazilians ,

Ita lia ns .- French, what<=wer , and a very good deputy to me in the CI A.

J ust a

f i ne intelligence officer, but not ,,rhat you would call a regaular Army soldt er .
Ge0 rge Benson was ver y prominent in Indone sia n affairs as mi litary attache
there , got to know everybo0y in Indonesia.

Came 1p, he got his star i n

Vi etnam where he harl a brignde for awhile i n order to punch his t;tc ke.+:s, hut
he's ret ired now; but. there .:,,re a nu!"lber of others o f that sort tha t come
up through the machine .

And La nsdale obviously, he had a very unique

ont.r ;thu-

tion to be mr1de to our country , not jus t to the Air Force 1 and he found his
:r-eally most -fruitful cont-r, ibutions in , the Ma~saysay period, t be Di em :".)e :dod,
and la er a n Lodge was ver y hi gh on him, you know, when he was ove;(' ;tn Vi etnam
with Lodge • .•
CBC:

Uhn hunh.

WEC :

And when he worked in t he :Pent agon in various of thos e staff jobs,

wher eever they al l are, he, of course, was highly regarde d b~t the Kennedys
and so forth.
CBC:
work.

It's very ini:eresti.ng.

Well, I know how military promot ion bor1.rds

When the y pull out his OER's te> look a t to determi ne whether to pro!nOte

hiTl'I, and it says, work cla ssified under nat ional security.
WEC ~

well, veah, but then s omething will come in from the top.

CBC:
WEC:

•.. says, oome on now •••

CBC :

Well, rar+-icularly given tJ,e f act that r: think- he's tota1ly fra nk

w-t th me when he s a ys he neve'!" really cared a_bm_~t r;;ink .. •
WEC:

No, I don't t hink he cared about it a. t a,J l .

his problems .

That was the l ec'\st of

No , he was very mur.h interested in fu.e work t o be done.
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CBC:

It's also obvious from l ook.in0 at the service record and seeino who

si']Ils the ~eriodic fitness ceports thcJt he was workiDg fnr the CTA.
For. cer tain parts of -the t-im
CRC:

0

•

Except . .. :i: don't think L-=msn.ale' s a. li.=ir.
Oh., no.

CBC:

Yet, he says he never ••. this is probably technical . ,,he was never a.

member . . • I think he says a rnemher . .. I was never a men,ber of the rIA.
wpo was seconded
Well , th.=it's true. He was like Dick Stillwe11 / tn CI~ for awhi,l~ when
WEC:
we badly needed some officers.

And he worked there a couple of yea.rs a,nd

worked there, but not a member of .. . in other words, he sttll r etainP.d his
assianed
to work
A:r.my r ank, his: Anny identif:;i:cr1tinn. Lansdell certainly was /
w-:i.th CIA which was a period :in '54 and a period i_n Magsaysa~, time, those two •..
CBC:

WE,-,.
~-

TThn hunh
• •• were
/t'l:-..e only t-ime I think he ~-rorked for CIA directly and he was on detail_

Like a .• • officer ••. attar.hea ...
Uhn huhl'l.

CBC:

t0 the Army War Colleqe.

WEC:

Ye.::i.h.

CBC:

Well, he was alsn a member of a thing called the Office of Polic y

Coordination.

Yeah.

But that wouldn't m;ike him

ri

membe!'.' of -the C'IA ., no.

That's what sent him out to As5a in the firs:t place,

Wh:i:c h is

a part of CIA.
It bec:am9 a part nf CTA.

When it 1•1as set np in, that -.:-?ould h"lve been

40'---

CBC:

I think it was '48 _

WEr.:

It was one of these things that we do •. . it was under the joint: manage-

ment nf CTA and the State Derartment.
CBC:

Uhn hunh.
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WelJ, it used CIA financi11.g, -Fin;and al help.

WEC:

And when Bee:l_l e }{~ Smit h _

bP.came head of CIA in '52, he said he wasn't- going t:o have the thing a'l'.'ound
unless h e co~manden it.

. , ... (unint,;,lligible) whPre BeEil- l e )('~ Smith spoke

a bou t thing s· l i ke that, and so they t r anqferred it to CIA.

'!'hey spi=mt a long

time i nt,,gr;ating it with the more t-raditiona l i n telli<_;ence side, in-1:elligi:>nce
And that, yo u know; it was a b u reaucratic team ove'.':'.'
s i de
many yi=>ars depenn_ing on whether you ca!!le o u t of: thP act-.ion J Q;!'.' the co J lec t i on.
coller:ti0n si·de nf CIA.

Now, t he~e wa s OPC and there wa s 0S0; 6-Ffice of Speci~l Orer~tinns,

CBC:

Of fice of Politic Coordin~tion
WEC :

The names don't mean a nything .

CBC:

Uhn hunh .

WEC:

But when he ·was i. n . . • working fol;' T,Qd<]e in '54-S r I think i _t wa,s ; he

was not work ing fo r CIA.
Righ t.

CBC:

Yeah.

I quess if anythi ng _- he was working fO!c St.=i,te Depr1vt."'nen-l:.

He ha,d th.e

rank o:e Minj_ster.
He prot-c\bl y. , .yeah, he prohably wa s assumed by th.e State just the wa y,

WEC:
"t>7hen

I want sent out the re I wa,q tur ned over a.nd b e ga,n to wo:rik. :e'or AID.

CR-:

He says that wa.s: a ver y uncomfortal:l,le :-eri od in h.1':: s life, becau se t-he.

-mi:.litary n0 lon ger trusted h i m b e cau se he was now State, and the State didn't
tru st him beca use he wa s p a st milita.ry wi th jus.t kind of a cou.r te.sy ;rank of
Min:tster,
WEC :

Well, you hay e t o r".:'a,l.i ze. t:ha,t; ;r: mean, w~ ha,~ i:it t-ha,+: period be.tween

two and,.,.and the. bureaucracies were really intense o:n their
and their. " .and Lansdale kind o f cut across thAm.

perogat;i:v es

He w~s- ass-;i:gne.d a,s- kj:nd of

a pe:i:sona, l adviser to Lodr;e a,nd then he staye d therP.. fo.'I'.'

,a•t•hile..

didn't have a :!:rograrn to run, and so he w3 s-n't a pro0ram mana,ger.

B11t he
Everynody
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'W EC:

else

".ATa.S

r unn ing programs, and he was an idea ma n a nd a cri t-ic .

And

the p:eople running pro']'rams would be v ery je~lolls of the ir rela tio nship witn
their V;te.t names·e co1mterparts, and when anothe r Arner 1' can wonld come in f rom
the side, w·ould c o nfns e both the Vi e t namAse and the A.me,,...ica ns

i'iS

to just who

wa s running the raiJ roa d .
CBC:

Uhn hunh.

WEC ~

And that's why th;a,t m:i_ ssi oJ?.-I th;tnk ;it d;i:d s ome. y e:xy useful th-inki ng .- had

some inte recting i:deas, it ne,_,er ']'Ot o ff the around in t e rm.c; of proc'luc;tng
Because
wha,t he produced for Ma gsa ysay . x:x/he d i dn't: have tha,t kind of s tru ctu re when
he wa,s with Magsaysay or he had the CIA .to use as hi s progi:-i:1,m ~ as- h;ts progra,rr-_,
But
and he could reac h in and get some money and us'.? it :F.or that . /in the period
in Saigon he didn't r e ally have a program ... (pause) relat ed to the Ambassador
;:ind the Vietnamese wer e a litt le c onfused as to where he fit into the s c heme
o f it.

CBC:

I t. bot her s me a little bit , I guess, unless

r tot-al l y m5:sunder str1.nd

him , he was a man wit h a good tra ck record , who comes into Vie tnam at thi s
point to try to figure out some way t-,o t r y to help the situation get better
r::tthe r t han just: stutb=>r a l ong from bad to wor.se .

Yet almost everyb od:'{

resented him , and you 're ta l king t o me a bou t. , .
WEC:

Did you e.ver see Bob Komer' s p i ece abo ut " Bureaucrac y Does Its Thing" ?

CBC:

Yes, I have.

WP.C:

I t's all there .

CBC :

Bob Komer is one o f t hose who despi s ed l ,ans dal e .

WEC:

We l l, h e s a w him a:=: competiti ve .

CBC :

Phi l Hab:il, you know ..•

WEC :

They had very comp arabl e obligations .

CBC:

Uhn hunh,

Yeah.

For obvious r e a,snns·, he , ••

Side l
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... and yet Bob was running a majnr progr am and he could n't: see just

how L~nsdale fit into it and .. .
CBC:

But d i' d he want to see how Lansdale fit i nt0 it?

what bothers me a 1 :i:.t+-.le hit.

I

I think: tnot 1 s

see a kind of p rotective. jealousy herP. tii.at •••

WEC:

welJ, you have bureaucratic ... the turf wa:i--s that exist anywhere. ••.

CBC:

Oh, we have them at the University . ..

WEC:

Yeah, I rec,li7.e tf)at . . ,Univer~iti"es have as ma.n!' a,s Flnynody •• •

cor por ati ons., .it isn't just a government p r oblem.
But the pyobl em is that Lansdal e I s ass igrn:nent a,t tfo,,_t pP.;riod was fairly
fuzzy , he d;i.dn 't have a cl.ear-c1-1t missi on , and it was- sort of, go ove.-r and f.;i::pd
somethir>g u~ef11L

Well, everyboc'ly wa s· bus-ily engaged in Program 'A, Program R r

P;t;og:r;'am C, Prog;t;am D and each tho ugh t that those prog1:;ams were terr;tbly uS'f'fuJ ., .
and to find hiJ"n sor t of on the outside, ynu knowr wandering around it ~ made
them v ery uncomfortable.
CBC:

WeJ l, I-0dqe even tells- hi.m at one point, stop going out ;i.n the.

c ountrys;i.de ,

Don't t a lk c:lirectly with Viet namese.

Bu t that was PJ.s· genius.

Su:r;e,

WEC:

Yeah.

CBC~

Uh.,,

WEC~

Well, what should he,v e been done was, he should ~ve been b1;ought into

o ne. 0:f; the vro9;rams .

I mea,n by the time t he program got suff;i.cien.tlv articulated,

he was- qone ... when d i d he leave .. ·1 6& sometime wasn I t .it?
CBC:

Was he there during ... he was there duri ng TET.

WEC:

I t hiDk hP le~t •.•

CBC;

~o it must have been · '·•·69.

WBC:

r

CBC:

TThn hunh,

th.ink he le:f;t not long i;l,fter that .

That' s ri<;ht·, he. ~s.
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WRC:

.. ,
He left ... pacif iGatio n ~rogra m was . gettin g going

CBC:

nnder someti mP- duvin g
He was: tellin g TT1e ahout some Lt. Col. , ArJT1y colllin

of t!le a::!:'ea.s of toW!' and
TET, who was tryi ng to find some Viet Cong in some
little shant ies, c1.nd Lansd ale
he .-•as using artill ery t o bla st r3part these che ap
peopl e have spent month s
s;1id that he remon strate d with the Col. that those
just blowi:rog them i'l.part i n a
and ·month s h 11 ;tld i .nc; thos,e shant ies, and you are
one of those house s anywa y .
m"'.tter of minut es, e,nd the:i::-e are Viet Cong in onlv
ary respo nse .
So he felt very frust rated with that kind of milit
WEC:

say.
And you can under stand wha t the milit ary would then

CBE::

Oh, yes.

WEC~

':',nd he;t'e comes
;r mean: this Lr. Cnl. . batte ry . .• bc,ttal .;i:.on commande;i;,,

.. .
a.n A;i..r Force Major Gener al --whi c h he was by then

CBC:

He would have been by thnt time _. yes,.

WEC:

buildj: :,ngs daW11,
, ,.in on him a.nd talkin g a.bout dontt knock thos-e

nder to move throu gh that area,
a.Pd ht=>. ' s qot his orde:t 's from his divis ion comma
would get into ,.
you know .•• ;Lt's fo,irly typic al of the p!'.'obl ems he

CBE::

Uhn hunh.

WEC ;

• . . becau se. he. really wasn 't pa.rt of it, y0u know'.

If a, staff of;f; :lcer

.. ,he wo11ld be fittin g in with.
of t-he divi sion came. down, could say, oh, c o me on
tbe organ izat;t0 naJ. event s,
know. , . lfke hav;i:n g

;i,

But when Lansd a l e came in fraim thP outsi de, you

newsme,n critic ize yon .

CRC:

Unh. hunh.

WEC:

T

CBC:

I: unde. rstand .

life..
me"'n, I'm not just;i: fying it but it ;is a f a.ct o f

r the. Vietna mese.
Lansd ale sai d that a fter that pa,rtic 11la,r incid ent

wa,nt any Ameri can +:o c0me
w:tth. whom he. ha,d worke d for years Rad:,n, we doY!' t
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CBC:

in saying any thing to us.

It had reallv disappoin ted thP-m.

of cour s e, he carries that same k j nd of d i sap poi ntment even now,.

:n.nd

/

Well, I was talkin<] about a nameless Army Lt. Col . battalion comma.nder-f or a long time LansdaJe wa s just an Air Force Lt . Col. , and I'm not sure just
how- such. t hin gs work.

Maybe yoi.1 can hel p me out on thi s .

He talks a oo11t

comi~g b a ck f rom the Phili;_:,pin es rt s a Lt. Col. He hadn 't s een his wife He len
wi th
fo ,,. awh;i.le, so / her an<'l the boys, they we11t o f f o n a Florida v a,cat ion, and only
a day or so after they had gotten tn Flnrida, he s ays. he was .interrupted. by

te l ephone call f rom John Foste r Dulles.

A.

Now. he won't expla in t hat, but, you

see._. I'm also a Lt. Col. in the Army Reserves s o I had some idea of the lar, k
of worth of ~omebody of that r a nk--wh at is t h e Secretar y o f St~te , wnnse b rot he~
?

is a gai na'E CIA, d0ing calling d i re c tl;,7 a Lt. Col.?

~-

WE r.

Well , I c c1 n e nvisage that.

,John would have been p r oud of what. he. did

tn
i_n the Philippines and he 90s!';:ibly . . . we t o lhght. to list e nkhis: guy; h ei!'c go t some
y ery intere ~ting ideas and expe rience.

I know . .. I had an incident that I just

casually menti0ne<l in the book, speci fi c;ally nameless ; whP-re I was given a ver y
s e cret agent to ruJ'l ,, whn had been in the countr y for quite awhil e , a nd I didn •t
know· anythJ ng .:ibont him .. . and I di s cove red

in h is background , h~ us~ d t o

wander in the c oun try and make h i s i nqu i ries and go ba0k.

On one. occa.sion he

was· :::,ick ed up on a street c o rne r b y a 1 i..mousine wi th Alle n and Fos:ter i n i t . ••
CBC :

Oh~ my.

WEC :

And hB brie.fed them both.

Now I about lost my mind .

That's the wrong

way to run the intell.i gence ~ervice.
CRC:

TTnh hunh.

WEC :

Raw mate r;i.;i l and r a w opini on <;oin g smack in at t he polic y lE=wel .

But

w-i th. t hat bac kg1:cound, I can understand e a sil y how- Fos:ter might h9,ve called him . ,
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CBC:

Arid . sai·d, we have this crisi s .• •

WEC:

Becau se fre'1u ently , you know, the peop le at
t he polic y 1 evel, they

l

get so much refin ed stuff that they are dying
tc get a strai ght accou nt from
someb ody.

Pr eside nt Kenne dy used to rip open .the c ables
from th.e field and

".'ea<l thPm befo r e they went- throu gh the refin
ing.

I think wear

a ltttl e

more soph istic a.ted now, but. •• b11t, ther e is
thcit hung er a t the top level to
get a real feel of what 's happe nin<J .
CBC:

Wel l , wA'vf'>, tal ked seve ral t i mes abou t

his r ole int-h e Philip p;i.ne s.

Are you able to talk abou t what help CIA offer
ed him i n the Phili ppi nes?
WEC:

I

just don' t knnw.

8ort of the auror a of it:.

I

was in Europ e a t t½.at t ime .

He hel ped Magsa ysa~:.

All I know· is

He may ha,ve been subs ta.nt iall v

respo nsihl e f or iden tifyin g hJ m as a come r,
and then esta,b lish his eleGt or a.l
ca.mp a.ign.
CBC~

wen,

WEC;

But I don' t know.

I picke d this ur ver y • • .

I

don' t know that of direc t know ledge .

It 1 s a,11

hea:rs a.y.
CBC~

I picke d thj<s u::::, spot tily tha t p r intin g
plant ~ th;i.t wel;'e p;r,int ing

ballo ts for the oppo sitior r suAd enly found them
selve.s. hayin g mech anica J. probl ems,
wi th. the occas ;iona l fire.; h e h2.d peopl e with
som<=> mone y . .•
WEC:

Well,

>'}OW,

now, Lans dale, h_is real contr ibuti :.o n was his
posit ive

th.tnk ing where he thi.nk s, you k now: why don
't you make the appea l along the
follo wing l inPs.
iden tify thPm.

Why don' t you devel op a song that the c adr e
cnn sJ'ng to
There he's

r\

geniu s.

CB:C:

I' think that' s true.

WEC:

Where he reall y puts his foot in i .t is some
o f thase fun and g-ame s

di'rty tri cks, which . is par t of what comes out
in the Pent agon p ape.!:'s abou t ••.
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CBC:

. .. the Saigon military . ~ . > ; ';.?

WEC:

No ...

CBC:

Lou Conein up there destroying the buses nf Hanoi?

WEC:

No, no . . . I mean that, ~,.rou knot.--? ... that isn 'it. going- to do anythin,:;.

Those of us who have heen in that kind of OP''~ration know- that tho s e tbi.ngs
really are . . . once in awhile they kind of work, but usually are a bloody nui.S:ance,
But the really ,rositive action can be of enormous ....
C'BC•

Uhn hunh.

WEC:

And thA,t' s where Lansdale' s real contribution is, triat he can think

of something li.ke thi s.

CBC:

Uhn hunh.

NEC:

He got i nterested in some poet in Vietnam; singe,r ~md 9oet a,nd, you

know. brought him u~; m-3de .:a thi_ng out of hi:.m.
him ,

People began to i.denti:.fy witfL

Well, that's good, because it gets someborly thinkinq positive .

strength, gat:herinq strength.

Ral lying

Psychologically, politically: whatever.

But going out and blowinsr up streetcar,c:; .. , doesn't help 3.t all.
CBC :

I've been a littlA amused about that.

Ac cordi.n g to severa,l sources

that I have talked with, prior to migrat.:Lon rrcnn north. to the Snuth Vietnam,
the west wa,s think.;Lng that maybe 10 - 15,000 mi ght move south.
WEC;

TThn hunh-.

CBC;

And Lan so a.le sai.d, hey, let' s really enco 1.1rasre these people .

They

i;;ot i'!.lmnst a million.

WEC~
CBC:

Yeah~

;then

And the saJ'l'le man who hAlps them think about large nnmbPrs r1nd/t ur0. s

a:round c1,nd tries to s.:a_bot-:'lge ·the gas tanks or city buses-.,.

WEC:

Yeah.

CBr.:

It's a stranqe ... di' sjuncture, •.
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Well, beca11Se - . , there was that 2eriod when we got into it wher e

WEC:

we think, well, by God, do something to them.

And I ran the parachute

operations into North Vietnam for awhi]e, a nd I came to the conclu sions that
We weren't ge t tiDg a nywhere .

the y - werP. effectless.
they be dr opped.

And I "t"ecommended

It was just when we t u rned that whole proji;:.ct over to the

militr1ry, and the mil itri_ry were out there going, welL by God ; we'll do it
the right way: we'll do a lot of it and it will have an impact •• •
CBC:

Uhn hunh,

WEC:

There is this:

we have to do to them what they've done to u s kirid

o-F phi losophy, instead of pickin9 a positive strategy and then going with it.
Well , he helped convince some of the :b.ot brri nds

CBC:

(.?}

in the Philippines·

that the best way to work with the Huks was to take their p r ogr am awa,y from
them .
WEC:

Ye.a,h, sul'.'.'e,

CBC:

That' :right.

Better 1cevolution than, . .
That's right.

You know he hel:;;,ed . ••
The way to s to::; gue rr i llas i s not to s hoot

WEC:

ThB,t
CBC:

1 !=:

1

ero; i t 1 s to r ecr u;tt 'em

0

how you eliminated gnerr illas.
Woulrl_ you shake ha.nds with

?,

college p y,ofessor?

(Laughter 1
WEC:

Tha,tts , my line.

Bi?.en t hat way forever .••

CBC:

I re.a lly am 'rery mu1:h in support Qi; th;.:it po sition.

Abs:olut ely; no douht about i t. You know we talk:ed ;:i bo1,t, I'm res;ponS'±hle
of course,
for the Phoenix rroc.:ram / bu t it was n I t any program of ki.lling men . What i t WFi.s

W"'.....C;

try;i:ng to do was identify who they v.rerP so t hat the y co11.ld be. captu;red , • •
CBC':

. . . interr ogated. , •
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convinced to rally or
.• , anc'l if necessary, shot out: .. . but the deaths were deaths primarily

·WEc:

i.n. fights outside the vi'llage i'lnd which our people u~ed to compla,;tn about .
They said, look, you are crediting all the!=:e people killls'!d, end they were just
killed i n regular military actinn; they weren't killed in anything +-lia,t-. Plioenix
did.

Our officers used to be sort of

about it; they fi';Ured they

were gone but we had their names erirlie.r and they hadn't rallied and they
hadri.' t been cartured 2".nd they were killed.

we fnund one, that's what ha.p::::,ened t0 them.

After

That's ,_.rhat happened to tl'i.em .

But the real thing that happened

was the North.Vietnamese , rather strange thing now, credited the Phoenix progra.-m
with eno:rmnus effectiveness ••. In Tarnow's (.Carnow's) book., . let me think.,. ,
(pausel .

But I still think +-ha,+- they have confused the. pac;tficat;t_o n pl'.."ogram

w--ith Phoenix; that the. pacifici;i,tion program was a li:l.rger p;i;iogri'Jsm, •.
CBC:

Uhn Inmh...,

WEC:

. , . involved J ocal elections and getting local_ gove~nmfmt soing and

tn...e. ;t'Pfw:_ree resettlement p:rogr.am; · all those- were part of the pric;t-fi_c At;i:pn
program , and there i s absolutely no doubt about it, bebveen • 6-.---.-oh., mus·t be
earlv '69 and the end of , a.b out

1

72 , yon pretty well stri2pe.d thE> country of

guerrillas, - but you di_d n't shoot 'em; yo1 1 recruited 'em.
CRr:

Uhn hunh..

WEC:

Well , we !=:et up a self defense Cl"'rp , peoples: s,elf cl.efense forcer

and tne id"'a. was tha,t people c ontribute to gua,!'din g the.;r..r home. town, horne.
vi'llage.

A,nd they spend one night a week, b-ro n i ghts. a. wee.."<. on gi.1.a,rd .

CBC:

Uhn h unh.

WEC;

.•• the kid~

them out: i.n the. e.veninq i;l,nd pir.k them up j'_n the morning..
next night .

.

in th.P nej'.qhborhood, keep a batch. of r i fles an.d hand

Pass the.m around tne

They dori 't ray them and they ei.r e not soldiers; t1'...e.y don't f .,' ght
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W8C:

very well; you don't expect them to.

But what you did, I m~an,

personally have d r iven through the country side at midnisrn:t ,
on Chr,'.stmas of

1

r

t;'lt1ts·µ 'le. of Hue

70 • • •

CBC:

By yourself .. .

WEC :

With the provinr.e chief, the Bri.ti.sh. Ambr1,s5,ador a,nd ,me ,'n one. jeep .

One other jeer with a couple of other officers benind, a.no we- went for a r~de.
at midnight wav out in the c ountry, .. and yo11 dr;i' ve along and i:n tfie fie.R,dl1' gli:ts
(uninte Uigibl e) . . , fel l ows up there with guns, which they would have snot
your head off two y~ars before ...
CRC:

Uhn hunh..

WEC:

Because you have given thPm guns.

We ha.d a b;Lg ar<;Wl}ent ,,bo11 t thi;J,t,

whether to arm the l0cal communities like th=.t. The a r gument wa,s-, weapons
will go to the en emy.
need your weapons.

They ha.ve got all the weapons, they n.eeil, they don't

The ot.her was thnt we would lose the weapons,.

lose some, but every man holding on~ of our auns is on our side .

Well,

And tliatts--, •.

I said ; you mav lose 20 per cent of the guns; we ar.tu0cllv lost about 3
per cent.
t:hero to .

Well, they won I t · fight very wel 1,,

WP- "l l

O't'

4

That's · right; ~fe don "t expe:ct

AlJ we want .:;i:.s- to t a ke C'om.rnun i ties that useil to be vulne'.1'.'ahle to

f i ve men with five pt stols- walking in rtnd · dom,· natin<; the vil lasre, it could no
longer be entered

by

five men with five pistol s; they will be sh0t at.

their' un;t.t will c ome and thGy will run away.

And

Ftne, it's a:!.l r1' ght w-:i::th.. me., ·

CBC:

Tt's sort of a civilian self protection program that Fatlier Wah- ran,.,

WEC:

Yeah, yea.h ; but that was the basis of the strategic hamlet pro9ram.

We ha,nded out a million guns; no, 500,000, excus-== me,
onP :rule, Isa.id, w?1,s· no p r stols .
Wor ld Wa.;i;

rr,

500.,000. guns ,

The

I knew tha,t. in the Philippines , tiianks- t o

where we dropped the da,mn

?

all ove;r the country, tna,t .

was one 0f the problems with election s and crime an:l evqry+:hi_ng eJ s.e..

A r t flP.

S:ide l
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very gond murd er weapo n
is a good self defen se gun , but it's not a

or crime weapo n.
CBC:

Not in a, crowd .

WEC:

No, -t t isn't .

So I said all the r ifles you

got 500,0 00 of theril- -ha.nn them out.

But no pisto ls .

wa.nt.

Y(')u know, we ha,ve

A.nd we didn 't have, •.

numb ers of young peo_r le to p r otec t
but the resu lt was we yec:ru it ed these large
ht they we:t'e doinq wflen they
their comm unitie s, which som_e of them thoug

i-1ere

work ing for the C0mm1_mist s.

CBC:

That 's rfght .
of looki n9 c,t it, hut I
Lans dale sa;td, .: it's a very sim::.=-li.fie d way

thi:_nk i t • s t mpor t,mt.

le 13,wa,y
He says:, in a peopl es •,wa,r, ycm take tfle peop

frnm the war. , •

WEC;

sure.

CBC:

,, ;;id and

WEC!

on your
Get the peopl P- on your side; <Jet the peopl e.

1,
then a,11 you ha,ve le:l;t are ba,nd i.ts you kiJ

siPE'~

Tnen you

is, the :real a,ppa,T ,,.tus· that runs •••
ha,ve to kno•..r WW:'_t the struc ture of th~ enemy
who those are- a,nn pic k them out~ a,nd
that ~s w:hat Phoen .;tx was abou t. To identi -f:y
put thPm in the hooseg <:!w
as you say,
And, ·you know, it does n't do any good to,
get the m to chr=tngP..
Q~
to shoo t up a whole lot of shan ti es.

Tha,t 's a job, too .

Get some evide nce as

ctor, then get two or three of t:fiem,
to who repo rts, o f who is the l oc?ll tax colle
he come; gra.b h i m.
now where , how· often does: he come, where does-

r.BC ;

Uhn hunh.

WEC,

The Mafia . type.

CBC:

Well, tha,t •s over simpl ified .

WF.C:

A. Mafia can d0min a,te a. comm unity,

CBC;

What no you mea,n can; they do .

WFC:

t hem a,nd (b) you ca,n focus
They do , unle$ ,s you a.id a cornm uni ty a'}ain st

Trace hin1.
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on those Mafia members, not the community as a whole.
Mafi" figures , . •

CBC:

Yea,h-, tiie. ;t;ecent court t :r;ia, ls in Na!:)les-, for ins:trince,

WEC:

Yea,h..

CBC:

• •• Jt's a,ctually a ver y brave thing be;i:.ng done, because tiie. , ..

••=r.
~u:, . •

•. , enormously cou:r::aJ e.011s, • • they lost a, fe-W' g"'ne,,.,i;!,ls on t lia,t, ••

CBC:

Uhn hnnh and a few jurlgei:; •• .

WEC:

Yeah.

CBC:

Jus t two more. things .

WE<::

S11re .

CBC:

Why do yo 1 1 think Lansdale fell 1.md"'r such. disfavor du;,:iinsr the Kennedy

But yo11 sti ll ha,ve to fight them.

r e girrte and even up into the Johnson regime; perhaps· l'!lore so i'n the J'olim~on
r egime, a,fter u nder Ei senhower and ~arly-Kenriedy he had been so well thouglt.t
of?
Well, he was ••. he is a bit of an unguid ed w-:tssile. ;f;rom the p0tnt o:f;

WP.C:

view- of the bure auc rar-y, be it militriry or c i vilian.
irregular area when he
with ;tdea, s-.

T•1

ork ed for CIA, or when he ""la,s·

His f3yol" lay at the.
fl_

p;r;,es:i:dentia,l a,dvi:ser

But when the bur ea,ncr.::icy t ook over to run thei:_r progranis-, thi;!,-i::

was whe n they were very suspi-c;tnus- of h i m aD.d the Pe-ntagon wa.s, thP- one tfiat
sai.d .· no tha,!!ks

they didn't wa.nt h im t-o be. Ambassador •

CBC:

I heard it was George Ball.

WEC;

we.1 1, I don {t know who :it was·, 'but a,nywa,y , somebody J i ,k?. tna_t • . ,

to put ;i:nto t ha,t job.

He's not an organizer,

who Also wa,s not: an org-"n;tze.;r: .
he was
Ed ,

a.

sem'or Republican .

Well , they :p ut Cabot Lodge. .in,

But he hi;l,d a, diffe.r:ent politi'ca,l ba,r.kg:round;

Now, I think the bu:r·ea11cracy c ouldn it fo=i,:ndl e.

Th~t they jus-t , . , fu> mad e them ve;r;y unc omfnrtf!,ble il,nd he. ~o;r;it of i::ut

,;icross their 1 i:nes of r:o:mrna.nd .

CUnintelligj_hle)

And they jus t di:dn it wa.nt

/
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WEC:

him invol,red -

Unr'ler the . . then <:ab0t Lodge, who was a n eq1-1al ma;Ve:;t;;t.ck.,

I me;,,n, Elnd r: ert:ainly no organ iza_tio nal genius,

I mean Cahot,· coi.1 ldn •t-. ha,,re

tni.ngs
been less interest ed i n running a TY1.ission; he was lookin g a'r'ound f0r
that nee<led ... articula te them and Lansdal e and he were a g0od team
regard.

But of oourse, Lodge drove everybod y crazy.

CBC•

Includi ng Lan~dal e.
(LauglLte r)

_;Ln tfiat

I

at worR_
man, and as I say, t-hiq was a huge orgi'l_n;t.zatio nal structur e tha,t wa,~
And non-orga ni zationa l men get grc,1_md 11p in huqe organJz51 ,t;i::cna,l

out there.

/

str uctures.
CBC:

Yo11 are suggesti ng real l y tha.t he would need 13,nothe;i;, very top leve_l ,

powerfu l protecto r to hove remaini;,d emfectiv e during thos-a yea,:rs?
WEC:

What he r eally needed was to b'=' put: uncler somE>-body and, .• l i ke mys·elf,

h;i::s-th::: pacif i cation. thing, arn'l. used as a member of the team, but us:eo_ fo:r

talents there, I guess.

You know, Bob Thomps:o n had the same p>:obl em .

Tfie_

Br:i' tish aclviser .
CBC;

Yes,

WEC :

He had exactly the s-a.me p roblem.

He was. 0utsi.de th.e- }?;t;ocedu;i:;e,

r

C

q0t a long extreme ly wP,11 wi.th Bob, even though_ we- d ±s:a,greed cm s:om,e; tn;i::ngs,
it didn't ma tter.

r

thought he was an absolute genius in the contriout -;t:on

he !!lade to 0ur efforts the re.

But military just cou ldn 't stand h i m; the. police'

program was up the wall everytim e he opened his mouth,

He would go in and

b '.!;ief the. Preside nt or Henry and hrllf the burei'luc r acy would qu;t.ye:r _

I thou<Jl:l..t

he was g reat:.
But that's wha,t he needed, was: to be bro ught .t,nto i'l srtem s:omewhe r~
so that he could be u$,e d as
Cli~.DE 1 END~ )-

a.

senior s t aff officer, a senior id<:-a man, . ,

,

Direct :or , at his homP
Side 2 - Interv iew with Willia m E. Col.by _- fox-mer CIA
24 June 1985 - page 24

I

WEC:

thenfu: ;i::ng
B11t the i.dea being that you have to get those ideas and

then c0uld come- down
them 1nto a pro']ra m or into a structu l'.'e s o tha,t they

I

throug h the proper staff • .•
CBC:

the Pfij:J .tI?ptne s,,
I think that's very insigh tful beca us.e when he was t .n

wb.o fie_d the prog:rii3;ffi who
he was an idPa man for Magsaysc,i_y who had the staff,
c ould exped ite it ...

Who could put it toqeth er.

WEC :

Yeah.

CBC:

And :j:t worked very well.

WEC ~

Yea.h.

r'BC:

In Vietna !!'..• ,

WEC':

who h9;ve e.sta,nl :i::shed
We have had a. l ot of lone opera tors, C;tA, ty?e{>,

chie.f of gove"'.' nment or
tha,t ki' nd of a ver y good person al relatio nship with. a
foreig n roljti cal figure .

And by a n enormo us empath y of the- kind that Lansq ale

offj:c; tal U. S • policy
has and basic s uppor t, been able •. . and don't rea.d 'em
sly, I'm not speaki ng
every mornin g; you know, just be out there., be obviou
fo r you.
for the offici :al U.S. govern merit; here is just an ide.3.

N0w-, then

displa cing the. Ambas sador .
the tr i ck of the trade is to m;c,ke sure thnt he is not
tel y
And the way we f i nally worked out to do that was separa

WP-

cha,,,ge ,
the ,n..n,b.;i_ss;c,doi:: ) ,s o that Ambas sador knovrn that he is in
the tool.

coordi nated
A.nd tfiis· is

enornoo us
Now a good Ambas sador cAn use someth iDg like that with

and hear things that
effect and say th3ngs that he as Ambas s?dor can't say
he as ~.,mb.;,_ss-"' · or should n't he3.r.

u .And i t's a wonder f1-1l one-tw o relatio nshJ' p,

char<Je .
depend ing on c0nvtn cing the Amba ssador that he is in

A.nd we have ha,d

had some ,~,fie.r e the CI'A
a, number of those work ~rerv succe ssfull y, and we've
an enormo us.: :Ug!it
guy thou']h t tha,t he was the Amb2=,ssa do r and then y o u ge-t
r i ght a.way.
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/

Then it does,n 't work,

W'RC:

else talk to th~ Chief of State.

CBC:

T,anc::dal e was: so much. on his ow:n in the Phtli:ppi:nes ~nd ect:r;ly on t n

VJ'etna;m r so much on his own; thc1.t, you know, people like:. I:r;,on 'Mi:k.e j u st so:rt
of threw up thPi:r hands- and let him do wh<'ltever he wanted t0,

WF.C:

Yeah, yeah.

CBC :

Could .. .

WEC:

But wnen you get into the hea,l:t of; a proq!,l;'a,m, off, e1, JTl;'; jO:"..' p;i:;,og:oa,!l),

CBC:

co, ild you baye contr0lled Lansdale., i .f he. n ad been as·si:gned to wo;i;ik

fo;i;i you?
Yeah.•

WEC:

Def;tni:tely.

CBC;

Do you thi.nk he would ha,ve wor ked hapJ?i:ly?

WEC ~

I

0

got along extI.'emel y well with. John )?aul Vi:1,nn ($p?l. a_n d ne. ~s, a,n

eq1 Ja,l :maverick, .•

CBC:

Oh, yes., yes, .

WEC:,

Vann finally c::a,m~ to me. at one. po;tnt and said, you kno'W',

:r:

be.lie.ve

so much i:n th.is program thqt. I:'m actually <JQi:ng to kee p my -rno 1.1tfL !"hut i3,fuut ±t ,
(La,11gh.ter)
WEr':

I sa,i.d., 00-r co!Tle on, John • • ,
(Laughter).

CBC:

That: 's very inter~stt ng.

WEC:

But .• • ym~ th.ink he'd listen to them,

Don't get ha,n'}ups.

(unintelligible 1.

Some people rlo gPt h;=mgups.

i.t ta,kes i s the rolP of an ·a17t.t st, the role of

But wha.t

a. genius

It's a tough busi ness

and not always gets t-he recognition it shnuld ha,.re and f r eq11.ent-ly qets the
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WEC:

opposition.

The

You know great artists are like this.

establi shments move against them when they come uo with new ideas .
wo~td i s a c custo~ed to waiting fifry yP.ars for them to prove out ,

The art

/

CBC:

By that t:i_me : of coul'.'se, the arr-ist is dead.

WEC:

Yeah , he I s- dead.

CBC ~

I think the artist would l ike the recogniti on dul;' i ng hi:s- li:fe.,, .

WE.C:

I think sc.

CBC :

Oh, yea,h.

WEC :

S1 1re .

/

But the good artist i s go.i 'ng to p J:;od12ce 9;ooa art a nd count

on it showing some day .
CBC:

But nonetheless his a.:i:'t • • •

And Ed is one of those ,

I have heard that duri ng the Eise nhowe,., administri=l,tt on , All.en nul l e.s,

and ,John Foster suaaested t o Et senhower that La~sd.:ale be sent . .. . be me.de
~mbaSS'l'l dor in Vietnam.
WEC:

he might

Have you ever. her1rd that story?

Well , only that his vis i t in the end of the Eis~nhower thing was that
become

Ambassador.

I don't know.

You mean during the '50 1 s?

I

CBC:

Yes.

WEC:

50 1 s period.

CBC;

The middle '50 s ,

WEC :

I heard that story . " .I just don't kno\v',

CBC:

I've heard it f r om two different sour ces and I thouqht I'd try it out

1

on you.
WEC:

I just wouldn't know.

CBC·

OK, lastly, Mr. Colby.

Se el' haven't confu s ed you once today,

(Laughter )
l' felt like s,11ch a fooll
WEC:

Oh~ no , don't he silly .

Such a t0tal fool.!
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CBC:

I thought maybe you smiled in yonr letter.
(Laughter)
If he had become A.mbassador. do vou think. things· in Vietna,m mi_glit

have taken a, different cnurse beci"!,use of his sup:rort fo r the Di.em regime?
Anot he:".' way to ask tha,t. , c0uld the Diem regi:me hc1.ve

111

an.,,.g ed to improve W';L:tfL

p r.aper tutelage?
WEC:

No, I don't think sn.

I thi.n k. the. Diem :regJme

0

•

•

I tI:iink_ tI:ia D;teni

re0imA was doing 3,bou t as well a,s it would a,nd actui\lly it wa,s better tI:ia,n
-most regimes t-ha,+- f0.ll0wed .

Th?,t indeed when Th.t.eu f i;nally out his regime

togic:>tner, he made no secret of the fact 'that hP essent;i:.a,lly r an the. c 0untry
;i::n the same

way that Di:em did .

CBC:-:

Uhn hunh.

WEC:

He thought that was the way it onght to be run,

A.nd

r:

a.g:ree,,

r

you know, the thi ng that destroyed the Diem regime was the. ratner intense
poli'tical attack on Diem , a,nd the simpli sti: c concept that only by· betng

a. real democrat could he fight off the Communists .
CBC:

Uhn hu11h.

WEC:

Which reaJ.ly i s i .l'.'relevant.

off the Commun.;i:sts .

I mea,n , tha,tts not the ~a,y to f'J9ht

The WcW to fight off the Cnmmnnists: is thro11gii strateg;tc

hamlets, so me forrn of pacifira,tj•on program.

Now· if you say tha,t if L;:msda,le

ha,d been there and had put our maximum support behind str8..teqic ha,mlets in
'62 .and c arrierl it on, he would not have been ;::ible to "".1.tfag.ta,nd the upnea;v,':'!,l
o f tht> da,ys C,?l

That picture of t:he Bonze

pa~e o f Ltfe Magazine did it.
couldn tt do j:t.

on tlie, front-.

Nothing could wi:tfist~nd i t

Now·, now we think of tho$e Banze

Kennedy

that ~an tn~t ~s -

essent;i.allv doing to Di em whqt thP Artolla,1:L KohmeJ'ni. <'ltd to tfie $fia,h.
CBC:

Uhn linnfi., uhx1 , hunfi ,

•.
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I

WEC=

He took a reasonably good regime ...

CBC:

... and he .•.

WEC:

••. destJ'.'oyed it and thBn r epla,ced it with a m11cI1- wol;'se one.

mean, that 's essenti ally what hap9ened there.

I

Now', you 're not s'cl,y;tn<; it ts-

a p er f ect regim<::' by;=; long shot, but the Diem regime •. • if we ha,d foc u sed on
the war a nd t-he ::_:,eoples' wa r nnture of it, then it's my belief that :it coulc'l.
ha,ve poss-ibl v been stop9ed about '65--' 64 .• -vigorous push- of t hes e st:t'a tegi:c
hamlets and puttin? them tngether and correcting the eJ'.'l'.'ors.

But we had the

rig-ht strategy. The Communists knRw that . They have. said so . They knew •• •
Wilfred
comment , that 1962 belnnged to the govepnment , Belonged
you know Burchett's
ta the government,

They picked up the program and pushing and ha,d the

;initiative in the battle .

/

CBC:

That's really tellinq.

WEC:

Yeah.

CBC:

Lansdale kePps saying that the wor st problem wasn't the assass;inat:.ion

Yeah,

That's a year before the as s assination.

/

on Diem and the coup but the fr1ct that after Diein was assassinated, t he du ly
elected consti tutional vice president wasn't allowed to step into the offi ce .
WEC:

But he was hopeless.

CBC:

But when you rno11e away from the Constitution

WEC:

He djdn' t, he coulr'In' t .. . even fact reality.

CBC:

I don't even remember who the guy was .

WEC:

Tho.

CBC:

Oh.

What's his name?

T H 0

He was a nice gentleman.

governments.

Tho.

He actually tur ned up in one of the later
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CBC:

Ok: I guess those are all the questions I have.

WEC:

Well, you have got a very interestin g subject and I a.rn sure you
.
I tnJnk.
w-:i:11 do it very well. He ;i..s a very interestin g f P.llow,/ If you look. on ;i..t:

a.s· t0 how do you .. . ho••" do you oeal with a maverick -artist .in a la,rsre
;i..nstituti onal bureaucra cy; that's the r:r:;oblem.

And there aren't any P.asy

answers.
CBC:

~.

WE I"'.

No

there aren 't .

Yes, we no.

tha,t they have.

And yet we need them both.

We need the large insti.tuti ons, we need the disciplin e

We also need the geniuses.

How do you pa,tch. them togethe.1;?

CBC:

I probably won't come up with an eternal answer.

WEC:

Well, I'm trying to ... one thing I'm doing with. my book i s to say that

Bob Komer , I think, had a gl i mm0 r of how you do it, wh.i.ch. is., y ou ad h0c ;i..t.

You see, instead of using the instituti on s a!': they are se.t, you a,d hoc a
structure for the rroject, and then you nraw the. support from the. othe-r
agencies, involve them in some ad hoc manageme nt, that's what people don't
understan d about these things.
CBC:
That I s very muclt like Franklin Delano Roosevelt • • .
WEC:

Yeah.

CBC:

, .• approach. the New Deal ,

WEC:

Oh, yAah.. whenever he ha.d somet-.hing that wa,sn 1 t wo;r,kin g he. would fo;t;I!}

.=i,

ne""" agency.

CBC:

That's right,

WEC:

And he cl.idn't care if it contradic ted four times wi th. t hj::ngs tiia,t

were alre,;idy c:roing on ••• He just, you know .. ,
CBC:

On e o f his biographe rs said that Roosevel t h i'!,d no long..-.te;t;::n v.t:s:t:on,

On any given six ....month problem 1 he ha,d a :=dx-cmonth. answe;i;,
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WEC:

Well,

r

think, once vou have fonned a bureauocrar:: y, ~,7ou have got

all the ills of it, and mayb8- yo 12 do we ll not to. , . I mean, people say why
cnulrln tt we instituticm alize the

a dull bureaucracy , too,
CBC:

(unintell igible).

I

have been writing to those mis:era,ble

people f o r a year.
Ka,rnow

Spe~k to

CBC:

YRa.h-, he did.

END OF TAPE

It wou ld become

Form a new one.

How do I get into Vietnam?

WEC:

No way .

He got there ,

.'
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